Image: The Storting building in Oslo, Norway, in June 2024. photo: By Christian David – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Storting_building.jpg

There are several reasons why Canadians, and other outsiders, might be interested in learning about the implications of September’s election results in Norway. Norway is a small state with a small population and a large territory, both land- and sea-based. Like Canada, it is a major Arctic player and has an economy that is heavily dependent on resource extraction. It has a very comprehensive welfare state and a well-functioning government, not least due to a highly competent public administration. It is closely affiliated with the European Union but not a member state. Furthermore, with more direct bearing on the election, Norway has a comparatively high level of trust in government and exceptionally large fiscal capacity due to its massive pension fund.

An interesting question is whether these factors make Norwegian elections, electoral politics and party politics diverge from general tendencies contemporary party systems experience. Political parties and party systems are undergoing momentous changes. We are seeing the emergence of cartel parties – governing parties that become professionalized organizations caught up in the state and increasingly out of touch with the wider population.¹ In addition, we are seeing the social dislocation of parties through changes in cleavage structures (the left-right dimension and linguistic, urban-rural, regional, ethnic and religious lines of division) and declining party loyalty, as well as the rise of antisystem parties. The upshot is high electoral volatility and considerable political fragmentation.

For Norway, does high trust in government translate into less political polarization? Does competent administration with low rates of corruption translate into a more centrist and compromise-friendly system of government? The assessment of a single election result cannot offer anything close to conclusive answers. But we can look at overall trends as a basis for informed speculation about what the overall patterns and the underlying forces might be.

Labour remains in power

On Monday, September 8, Norway went to the polls. Election dates are fixed, and the election cycle is four years. That also applies to regional and local elections that take place in between the national elections (regional and local elections are to be held in 2027). The participation rate was 80 per cent, the highest in 36 years, a manifestation of Norway’s high level of political engagement. Out of these, a record 47.1 per cent was in advance votes. A total of 22 parties competed and nine of them won seats in the unicameral Norwegian parliament, the Storting. The new parliament that came out of the election is the youngest ever.

Norway’s electoral system is one of proportional representation in multimember constituencies. There are also 19 at-large seats distributed across those parties that reach the threshold of 4 per cent to bring the total closer to proportionality. Much of the fluctuation in the number of seats won by the smaller parties reflects whether they are able to reach the 4 per cent threshold. In this election, the Greens reached the threshold, as did the Christian People’s Party, while the liberal Left Party fell below. The Greens’ decision to side with the left when it came to forming the government was important because it enabled the leftist parties to hold on to power.

TABLE 1: ELECTION RESULTS FOR NORWEGIAN PARTIES FROM LEFT TO RIGHT

Source: Compiled from data presented in Valgresultat for Norge – Valg 2025 – NRK

As table 1 indicates, the parties can be ranked on a left-right axis (though the cleavage structure is more complex with cross-cutting regional, linguistic and religious issues), since election campaigns pit different coalitions of parties against each other. In this election campaign the left coalition was composed of the Red, Socialist Left, Labour, Centre and Green parties, while the right coalition consisted of the Christian People’s Party, the liberal Left (Venstre) Party, the Conservative Party (Høyre or the Right Party)² and the Progress Party. The outcome was the left coalition winning 88 of 169 seats, allowing the minority Labour government to remain in power, though the coalition experienced a net loss of 12 seats.

Coalitions can mean either that parties govern together based on a shared governing platform, or that one or two minority parties form the government and parties to its left or right support it on an issue-by-issue basis. In the previous parliament (2021–25), Labour governed together with the agrarian-based Centre Party for much of the time.

Labour is the only truly nationwide party with a strong urban base. Many people found Labour’s voice weak in the outgoing coalition, and its support had sunk significantly in the polls. After the Centre Party left the government in early February, some deft political handiwork in an uncertain global situation resulted in Labour’s support bouncing back sufficiently to be in a position to continue in government after the election. The coalition with the Centre Party pushed many Labour voters away. When it left the coalition and Labour brought in the popular Jens Stoltenberg, former prime minister and NATO secretary general, as its finance minister, Labour’s support rose dramatically. People felt that this was the Labour Party they knew and trusted.

Continuity, fragmentation and a turn to the right

The overall picture that emerges from this election result consists of (a) continuity, (b) fragmentation and (c) a turn to the right. The continuity is mainly reflected in the fact that Labour retained its support and was able to continue to govern. Analysts underline the uncertain global situation as one important source of Labour support, since voters were seeking a steady hand on the governing rudder. Labour has a long tradition of being a major governing party. Its membership has remained steady over the last 20 years, although at a level that is only a quarter of the membership it had at its height in 1950.

Despite the continuity Norway, like other countries, appears to be experiencing a social dislocation of parties. Fragmentation resulting from the sizable share of the seats in parliament won by small parties that were able to get above the 4 per cent threshold poses a governing challenge for Labour in that five parties need to agree for the left coalition to work. These parties converge on some policy issues but diverge on others – notably important foreign policy issues such as Norway’s EU affiliation, as well as the pace of the energy transition due to climate change. Moreover, the traditional rural-urban differences remain.

Political fragmentation is also apparent among the opposition parties on the right, since the opposition is composed of four parties with different views, notably on whether to cooperate with the right-wing populist Progress Party. Data from a citizens’ panel measuring voters’ sympathy for parties other than the one they prefer shows how much the parties on the right diverge in whom they are willing to cooperate with. The liberal Left Party’s voters, for instance, are very reluctant indeed to cooperate with the Progress Party.

One indicator of growing polarization is the decline in support for the centrist/left-of-centre Centre Party, which in percentage terms was the party with the greatest voter loss. But most striking is the significant increase in the right-wing populist Progress Party’s share of votes and seats. The Progress Party saw by far the greatest increase and is now the largest party on the political right, having traded places with the Conservative Party, which has the longest governing tradition and has always been the largest party on the right. On many major issues, in particular key foreign policy matters, there has been considerable convergence between the Conservative Party and Labour – so its decline matters.

This change in partisan strength on the right is potentially very significant and could breed further polarization. The Progress Party is a protest party which, though it has worked hard to present itself as respectable and responsible, espouses a very strict migration and asylum policy. Indeed, the Progress Party often presents two faces: an official face through the party program, and an unofficial face through the less polished words of outspoken party officials – which provide, it is generally assumed, more authentic insights.

The Progress Party earlier stood out from other right-wing populist parties in Europe by being less Eurosceptic and less anchored in rural areas. In this election, it has gained significantly in rural Norway by replacing the Centre Party, and in so doing it has come to more closely resemble other right-wing populist parties. Hence, a key source of polarization was associated with a turn to the right, especially since so many young men flocked to the Progress Party, something parallel to what we have seen elsewhere. Though less noted, there was a significant gender cleavage, with young women voting for the leftist parties.

Another new factor for Norway that appears to mimic developments in other countries is the increased role of influencers and money in driving the election campaign. Overall, despite favourable socioeconomic circumstances, high levels of trust and the centre-left in power, Norway, while starting from a lower level of polarization, faces an emerging trend that is not different from what we see in democracies elsewhere.

Continue reading “Polarization, Norwegian style” →

For Norwegians, Americans are both “them” and “us.” This duality has historical roots, tracing back to the massive Norwegian emigration to the United States that began in the early 19th century. Today, almost as many people of Norwegian descent live in the United States as live in Norway, and the bonds between the two groups remain strong. Consequently, Norwegians exhibit a deep attraction, indeed fascination, with the United States and have formed strong emotional attachments to it.

Norwegian politicians and the general public closely follow developments in U.S. politics. Media outlets cover a wide range of topics, from news and celebrities to popular culture and scandals; academics attend American conferences, build networks, and seek to publish in American journals. Many people travel across the Atlantic both ways. Left-leaning Americans have been fascinated by the Nordic Model, which features generous public health and welfare policies, as well as Norway’s use of its petroleum-based sovereign wealth fund, which has attracted particular attention.

Geopolitical developments reinforced Norwegians’ attachment to the United States, especially once the United States became more globally active during the first half of the 20th century. Norwegians have expressed deep gratitude for the American war effort in Europe and its role in quashing the Nazi regime that occupied Norway. Prior to the rise of the Nazi regime, Norway had been more closely aligned with continental Europe, particularly Germany. After World War II there was a pronounced transatlantic turn, with Britain and the United States becoming far more prominent not only in economic and security matters but also culturally and scientifically.

Ironically, just as Norway/US ties in recent years were becoming stronger,  the Trump regime began a highly effective job of wrecking America’s reputation as a reliable partner and as a beacon for democracy, the rule of law and legally regulated trade and international relations. The reaction to this “wrecking ball” approach was to begin shifting Norway back toward the European continent.

Attraction and distance

The Norway-U.S. relationship is marked by attraction and distance. The distance is not merely physical but also political and ideological. Though the United States and Norway belong to the same Western liberal-democratic family, there are ideological and socioeconomic differences. Norway is far more egalitarian than the United States, and even if it has a history of violations of the rights and culture of Sami people, this was never of the same magnitude as America’s institutionalized slavery or slaughter of Native Americans, and Norway has not experienced internal strife comparable to the American Civil War (the Quisling government during the Nazi occupation had very limited popular support).

Ideologically speaking, the Norwegian party-political spectrum is clearly to the left of the American. There is still a high level of trust in government and a widely held recognition that a well-functioning state bureaucracy is essential for a well-functioning society. There is cross-partisan support for the public health system and generous welfare programs. While there is disagreement over the nature and level of taxation, most parties in Norway recognize the need for tax revenues sufficient to cover the costs of generous public benefits. Indeed, it is possible to promise higher taxes and still win elections. Demography, topography, and the need for security vis-à-vis neighbouring Russia place stress on Norway’s generous welfare state within a decentralized governing system, but its politicians can and do draw on the massive petroleum fund to make up the shortfall.

Dependence and vulnerability

The high level of Norwegian interest in the United States combines an attraction based on inquisitiveness with concerns due to power and vulnerability. As the world’s major superpower, the United States has a significant impact on Norwegian affairs, both directly and indirectly. Here, distance is an asset and a resource, while proximity is a source of vulnerability.

The Trump administration’s wrecking job draws attention to Norwegian vulnerability to erratic American policies. Vulnerability can be said to comprise two key dimensions: external threats and internal coping mechanisms. An intensified external threat and a decline in internal coping mechanisms yield an increase in vulnerability. For Norway, the most apparent area of vulnerability is security. Norway is a member of NATO and has dismantled much of its Cold War military capability, leaving it largely dependent on rapid allied military support in the event  of a Russian attack. There is now a commitment to a significant increase in military spending, but this will take time to translate into operational capability.

Norway has a 197.7-kilometre-long border with Russia, so the threat is tangible. This border runs near the Kola Peninsula, where Russia has most of its nuclear submarine fleet. Russia is therefore also concerned with what Norway and its allies do, especially in the border province of Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost province. Norway has maintained a self-declared policy since 1949 of not allowing permanent foreign bases on its soil. Still, this stance has been reversed in the last decade, with the establishment of a small American base in central, though not northern, Norway.

The Russian external threat has arguably increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Even if Russia has not directly threatened Norway, cyberattacks have increased. Russia is militarizing the Arctic, potentially putting Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago in jeopardy. Moreover, Norway is not a member of the European Union and therefore cannot rely on the same level of European support as can EU members. This is important because the EU is itself shifting from emphasis on “civilian power Europe” to strategic autonomy, including in security terms. Together with its member states, the EU is taking measures to make up for waning U.S. military interest and presence in Europe, and has become engaged in a wide range of areas of soft security (including cyberthreats and economic security).

The question of Norway’s EU affiliation is closely tied to the internal dimension of Norway’s vulnerability. EU membership is highly contested, and there is little appetite among most politicians for undertaking a lengthy and arduous application process, given that the question of Norwegian EU membership was rejected in two popular referendums (1972 and 1994). With the membership option more or less domestically blocked, there is less assurance of European support, which places Norway in a precarious security position. Norway has sought as close an affiliation with the EU as possible for a non-member in virtually all areas of EU activity, but that cannot compensate for the vulnerability that non-member status entails.

Recent developments also underscore the need to consider power and vulnerability in relation to trade and tariffs. The United States is one of Norway’s main trading partners, with Norway registering a trade surplus. In 2024, Norway’s imports from the United States amounted to NOK 61.756 billion, and its exports to the United States were NOK 82.677 billion, for a surplus of NOK 20.921 billion (USD 2.034 billion).

By Trumpian logic, this constitutes unfair trade, so Norway was subjected to a 15 per cent tariff. Norway’s large trade volume  with the United States makes it vulnerable to Trump’s machinations. Furthermore, whereas Norway is incorporated into the EU’s internal market through the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA), it is not a member of the EU’s Customs Union and is therefore vulnerable to EU retaliatory measures against American tariffs and the shield that the EU puts up against third countries to protect its market from being flooded. The EU has expressed support for Norway’s situation, but what that concretely amounts to remains to be seen.

A third source of vulnerability stems from Norway’s significant involvement in the U.S. economy, largely due to the substantial investment its large petroleum-based Pension Fund has made in the American stock market. Most of the fund’s investments are in equities, which makes it vulnerable to the vagaries of the market and erratic and unpredictable politicians. Indeed, the value of the Pension Fund has declined considerably since Trump took office (by NOK 1.1 trillion out of a total of close to NOK 20 trillion in 2024).

This brief overview reveals that Norway is highly susceptible to American influence and vulnerable to shifts in U.S. policy, particularly in both conventional and unconventional forms of security. Further, as a small country with a very open economy, Norway relies heavily on a legally regulated and predictable global economic system. Its close EU affiliation provides some protection, but has its limits because of Norway’s reluctance to become an EU member.

The Trump administration has threatened to take over Greenland and the Panama Canal, and even talks of making Canada the 51st state. It also directly seeks to influence politics elsewhere, such as when Vice President Vance supported the extremist AfD in the German election. In the case of Norway, the American embassy demanded that the company delivering remote heating, Hafslund Celsio, sign a declaration stating that it does not have any DEI programs. If it did not, the embassy could cease its payments. The company is majority owned by the Oslo municipality; not surprisingly, it declined to sign. An editorial in the major broadsheet Aftenposten commented: “There are probably some employees in the embassy who are annoyed by what is being imposed on them by their chiefs in Washington … embarrassing and futile diplomacy.”

Trump’s lack of resonance

The Norwegian political establishment is, unsurprisingly, unimpressed by Trump II, but exercises caution in how it expresses this. That is evident in the decision by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour-led government not to retaliate against Trump’s tariffs. Instead, he and the finance minister, former NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, went to Washington and met with Trump, with whom Stoltenberg reportedly has a good rapport. Media reports of the meeting vary from commending the Norwegian government for its efforts to scolding it for not standing up to Trump.

Norway ranks at the top of the World Press Freedom Index 2025, and the media scene is in effect unanimously anti-Trump. No major media outlet voices support for Trump or his policies. It is on social media that much pro-Trump propaganda is to be found (one example is Dokument.no). Given that Trumpism does cross the Atlantic, a crucial question is how it should be addressed and opposed. The overall impression is that Norwegian media outlets are fairly cautious, striving to provide balanced accounts. One risk is underestimating the challenges to democracy or the strength of the authoritarian onslaught.

The differences outlined above between the American and Norwegian political scenes underline the lack of resonance for Trump’s policies within the Norwegian political establishment. There is no doubt that the vast majority of Norwegians will continue to support American values and, precisely because of that, be anti-Trump. After the election and Trump’s assumption of office, a poll found that 83 per cent of Norwegians think Trump is moving the United States in the wrong direction, with 7 per cent believing the United States is on the right track. Yet we should not ignore pre-election polls revealing that almost half of Norwegian young men would have voted for Trump.

We do not live in normal times (however we define normal). Perhaps in the future, people will look back on this time as the end of an unprecedentedly long period of peace and tranquillity in the West. We have had the privilege not only of dreaming democratic dreams but also of practising what we preach. Within the large tapestry of history, this may stand out as a rarer pattern than we would like it to be.

But morality, not history, should be our main guiding light. We need pessimism to cut through the conspiracy theories, but optimism to recognize the sheer value of what we already have. By fully recognizing the morality we have embedded in laws, institutions and political cultures, we have important and powerful countervailing measures. Public opinion is also shifting. The Canadian and Australian elections give grounds for hope, as does the rising US resistance. Every society that stands up, refuses to be bullied and joins hands with others supports a livable future.

To get there, we need to “bell the cat,” as the Norwegian saying goes. Autocracy, corruption, nepotism and deceit must be called out and confronted. We must work to ensure that the trolls will burst when the penetrating light of truth-telling shines upon them.

Continue reading “Trump’s wrecking job highlights Norway’s vulnerability” →

Photo: Jonas Gahr Støre, Kommunesektorens organisasjon, Via Wikimedia Commons.

A more fragmented parliament

In its parliamentary election on September 13, Norway took a clear turn to the left. Of the 3,876,200 eligible voters in the election – held four years after the last one according to Norway’s fixed-date system – 77.2 per cent cast ballots. The ruling minority centre-right coalition went down from 61 seats in 2017 to 47 in 2021, out of a total of 169 in the Storting, the Norwegian parliament. The right-wing populist Progress Party (FrP), which withdrew from the ruling coalition in 2020, also lost six of the 27 seats it held in the last parliament. Thus, whereas overall the centre-right parties had a majority of seats in the outgoing parliament (88 out of 169), they now have only 68 seats.

If we look at the overall pattern of party system change, the main result was political fragmentation. Both of the two largest parties lost seats, with Labour (AP) losing one seat and the Conservatives (Høyre) losing nine. The biggest winner was the centrist Centre Party (SP), which increased its seat total from 19 to 28. A similar gain took place on the far left, as Red (Rødt), a former Marxist-Leninist party, crossed the 4 per cent threshold and increased its number of seats from one to eight.

Domestic issues dominated the election campaign, and there was very little focus on foreign policy. There were flashes of attention to Norway’s relationship with the European Union, the main question being whether the expected change in government would lead to changes in Norway’s EU affiliation, given that the Centre Party is deeply Eurosceptic. The early stages of the election campaign were marked by a “revolt of the periphery,” which was directed against Oslo and other cities and gave a major boost in support to the rurally based, agrarian Centre Party.

The Centre Party could draw on popular opposition to a regional reform which had amalgamated regions and created the geographically awkward region of Viken, which stretches considerably to the north from the southeastern border with Sweden. A similar change took place at the northern tip of the country, where the two northernmost regions, Troms and Finnmark, were amalgamated against the will of the majority in Finnmark (the No side had won a referendum on the issue by a clear margin: 87 per cent against with 58 per cent participation). There was also discontent with the closure of local police stations and hospitals.

With the revolt of the periphery as a major impetus, in early January 2021 it looked as if the Centre Party could overtake Labour in the polls, and Centre Party leader Trygve Slagsvold Vedum declared himself ready to become prime minister. There were thus three candidates for prime minister going into the final stages of the election campaign: the incumbent Conservative Erna Solberg, Jonas Gahr Støre of Labour and the Centre Party’s Vedum. As the campaign unfolded, the centre-periphery and urban-rural conflict subsided somewhat, while inequality and the green transition moved to centre stage. All parties on the centre-left made rising socioeconomic inequality a theme of their campaigns. But there were competing accounts as to which aspect of inequality should be addressed, as the Centre Party stressed its rural-urban dimension.

The green transition issue gave the Greens (MDG) a boost in the polls, but in the election the party fell just short of the 4 per cent threshold and therefore only obtained three seats. The other main environmentally focused party, Venstre (as the Liberal Party is known), which had been part of the governing coalition, managed to hold onto its eight seats. The Socialist Left Party (SV), whose campaign stressed both socioeconomic inequality and the need for a green transition, gained two seats to end up with 13. The Centre Party is somewhat divided on how committed to the green transition Norway should be and for some time even prevaricated over whether it thought Norway should be committed to the Paris Agreement, although it came down in support of it eventually. On the other hand, the Progress Party has long been a petro-populist party and is a staunch supporter of the oil industry.

The government’s loss of seats cannot be easily attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Norway’s fatality numbers during the COVID-19 period were lower than in a regular influenza year, and the Norwegian government has launched a range of policy programs to buffer people from the pandemic. The negative effects have been far from equally distributed, but it is difficult to pin the responsibility squarely on the government, which as a minority coalition has depended on parliamentary support from opposition parties that at times have dictated government policy.

The new government takes shape

The election result paved the way for a change in government. Unlike Germany, where the Social Democrats governed together with the Christian Democrats until this fall’s election, Norway has no tradition of grand coalitions, and its coalition governments are aligned along the right-left dimension. The left-right cleavage structure is complex, however, with a significant centre-periphery and urban-rural dimension cutting through it. That means that some parties can change sides, as has been the case with the Centre Party. Minority governments without the two large parties are rare. The norm is either a coalition to the left led by Labour or a coalition to the right led by the Conservatives.

As leader of Labour, the largest party, Jonas Gahr Støre initiated talks with potential coalition partners. He sought to reinvigorate the so-called red-green coalition consisting of Labour, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party, which governed between 2005 and 2013. In this coalition, which was led by Jens Stoltenberg (now NATO Secretary General), Støre served as foreign minister until 2012 and then health minister. Støre’s model coalition was weakened by internal divisions within the Socialist Left Party, with a minority often demonstrating against its own government.

The Socialist Left Party wanted to make sure that this time around it would not repeat the same mistake and therefore pulled out of the coalition talks to try to make more of a mark on its own, stating that it did not believe the other two parties were willing to go far enough in tackling socioeconomic inequality and environmental degradation. The upshot was that the two remaining parties, Labour and the Centre Party, were left to reach a deal. The new government is thus a minority coalition, with a total of 76 seats. The Socialist Left seats would have brought it up to 89 and a majority in the Storting. In any case, the minority Støre government will seek Socialist Left support before crossing the ideological left-right divide.

Labour and the Centre Party signed a governing platform declaration, dubbed Hurdalserklæringen from the town of Hurdal north of Oslo where it was negotiated. This 86-page declaration lists the government’s objectives in considerable detail and sets out a left-leaning agenda quite different from that of its centre-right predecessor. Key objectives include: steering a safe economic courseand just distribution; creating jobs and cutting greenhouse gas emissions; a just climate policy; green choices that tie the country together; a safer work environment for everyone; and welfare for all. The platform promises to tackle inequality along both socioeconomic and regional lines, but has been criticized for not doing enough about socioeconomic inequality, especially poverty in the cities. It has also been criticized for not paying enough attention to environmental challenges.

During the campaign the Green Party, in particular, called for a fixed date to end oil exploration, and Labour’s Youth Organization (AUF) took this position as well. The government program instead speaks of developing and not dismantling the petroleum sector. Commentators also note that the government compromised on CO2 emissions, especially given that the Centre Party was against passing on the costs to motorists in the regions. As a result, as was noted, the new government’s budget is less environmentally oriented than was the outgoing government’s alternative budget, but that governrment knew that its budget could never be implemented given the refusal of its partner, the Progress Party, to go along. Some commentators have concluded that Norway is far more willing to fight climate change abroad than at home.

Norway in Europe: Freezing the status quo

The question of Norway’s EU affiliation has been the most controversial issue in Norwegian politics in the postwar period. Two popular referendums have been held, in 1972 and 1994, and both turned down EU membership by small margins. Nevertheless, Norway’s EU affiliation through the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and some 70 other agreements make Norway so closely affiliated with the EU that Norwegian nationals are de facto EU economic citizens (although not political citizens as are citizens of EU member states). Some argue that the No side won the 1994 referendum but has lost ever since.

The text of the new coalition government’s platform position on Norway’s EU relationship is an amalgam of the statements on Europe of one broadly speaking pro-EU party and one very Eurosceptic one. The new government reiterates the “gag rules” meant to keep a lid on the EU membership issue and any serious change to the status quo. The tacit understanding is that if either party actively starts working toward changing the status quo, the coalition will unravel. The present governing configuration therefore falls into an established pattern of governing coalitions “freezing” the status quo, of which the EEA is the centrepiece.

Labour’s balancing act

The election campaign reflected the long-established Norwegian cleavage pattern that intertwines left-right with centre-periphery/urban-rural conflicts. The new minority coalition government has pledged to cooperate with the parties to its left. Nevertheless, the coalition reflects the attempt to reconcile left-right and centre-periphery concerns. This places the main governing party, Labour, in a squeeze: between a strengthened Centre Party to its right and a strengthened left flank with the Socialist Left and Red parties. This could be quite a precarious position, with the prospect of hemorrhaging voters either to the right or to the left, depending where it sets its foot. It remains to be seen how well Labour
will keep its balance.

This article was published as part of a larger elections feature for Inroads 50. To check out the rest, go to Elections Bring Change (Except in Canada).

Norway’s relationship with the European Union is generally treated as a legal construct. Moreover, the Norway model is generally depicted as an off-the-shelf mode of affiliation: take it or leave it. That underplays the complex and comprehensive nature of Norway’s EU affiliation, made up as it is of 130 different agreements.

At the heart of this relationship is the European Economic Area agreement (EEA), which governs relations among three nonmembers (Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) and all EU member states. This arrangement is marked by “dynamic homogeneity,” which means that the scope of the agreement expands in line with the dynamics of the EU integration process. Many of the other agreements that Norway has signed with the EU must be negotiated and updated on a more regular basis, and sometimes the text is not entirely in synch with the relevant provisions in the present-day EU reality.

In the case of the Schengen agreement on freedom of movement, for example, Norway’s affiliation with the EU was established when Schengen was still an agreement outside the EU treaties. Now that much of the initial Schengen agreement has been incorporated in the EU treaties, there is a discrepancy between the text of the Norway-EU Schengen agreement and the role and status of Schengen provisions within the EU’s own treaties. There are also “gaps” between agreements – in other words, issues that are not covered by agreements. That creates uncertainty, and pressure to “fill” the gaps.

Politics matters more to this arrangement than is generally acknowledged in the U.K. Brexit debate. The complex character of the overall Norway model underlines the importance of negotiation built into the relationship. When disagreements emerge, a political process is often called upon. In addition, the arrangement is workable as a result of a number of political presuppositions. These presuppositions can be described as a domestic “depoliticizing compromise” that has taken the political sting out of rejection of Norwegian EU membership in the 1994 referendum.

EU membership opponents have, formally speaking, been able to keep Norway out of the EU, whereas EU membership proponents have obtained guaranteed access to the EU’s internal market and almost all EU programs. Underlying this compromise is the fact that Norway entered the EEA agreement with the EU before the 1994 referendum, which saw a small majority of the Norwegian population voting against EU membership. The rejection had no bearing on the status of the EEA agreement. That Norway had already entered the EEA agreement with the EU made it easier for people to vote No because they knew that Norway had assured EU market access.

This compromise must be considered in light of the fact that Norwegian EU membership has figured as one of the most politically divisive issues – if not the most divisive issue – in Norway since the Second World War. The EU membership issue reawakened or gave added impetus to old and entrenched cleavages: it pitted centre against periphery, region against region and rural against urban, and it exacerbated deep divisions within and between political parties.

Considered against this backdrop, it is significant that the EEA agreement has integrated Norway into the EU’s internal market. Through the full range of Norway’s EU agreements, Norway has incorporated roughly three quarters of EU legislation. The EEA agreement includes such areas as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture. Key areas that fall outside the scope of the cooperation are the euro, the customs union and foreign trade policy, the Common Agricultural Policy and taxation.

However, precisely because the EEA agreement is a dynamic arrangement and there has been considerable integration within the EU since 1994, some of these areas have been greatly affected by the rules of the single market. Free movement of capital affects taxation rules, and a substantial number of veterinary and food safety rules are included in the agreement. Important aspects of fisheries and agriculture are thus affected by these arrangements, because the incorporated EU provisions to a large extent set the standards in both these sectors.

Today, 25 years after the EEA agreement came into effect, Norway’s comprehensive incorporation in the EU has sparked surprisingly little controversy even though it has profound constitutional democratic implications. Despite deep divisions over EU membership, Norway has faithfully adopted and incorporated EU laws and regulations throughout the 25 years.

What has sustained this close EU affiliation over time? Legal certainty matters. In addition, there are social, economic and – not least – political reasons that help to explain the affiliation. Economically, Norway has a long history of adaptation to changing international circumstances. Norway also has a long history of cooperation among government, management and labour and state-society interaction. It has a strong economy with a large sovereign wealth fund (due to North Sea oil) that forms a significant economic buffer. Furthermore, Norway has a very competent public administration and an extensive welfare state, both of which help to alleviate social disruptions from international exposures and assure a high level of public trust in government.

This does not mean that everyone is now pro-EU. The largest party, the Social Democrats (AP), have for most of the time been split with a rough 60-40 divide in favour of EU membership, and some parties, notably the Centre Party, have been against EU and EEA membership.

The Norwegian political system is hardwired as a consensus-seeking system, with consensus-seeking behaviour induced by the proportional electoral system that favours medium-sized parties and constrains the largest parties. Equally important, the political parties have instituted informal rules and arrangements to keep EU membership off the political agenda. All governments are coalition governments, and all coalitions consist of parties favouring Norwegian EU membership (even if internally divided) as well as parties opposing EU membership. As part of the coalition agreement – whether explicitly stated or tacitly agreed – the parties are committed to retaining the present EU affiliation. These factors have enabled Norway’s politicians to separate EU membership from adaptation to EU rules. It is possible for coalitions that are deeply divided on EU membership to stay together and operate in a society that has become increasingly Europeanized.

It has effectively become a constitutional convention to use a popular referendum to decide EU membership. This probably helps to entrench the notion that EU membership is a key constitutional matter, whereas EU adaptation is not. From a legal constitutional and democratic perspective this is a problematic distinction, not least because it discounts the cumulative effects of adaptation. The membership/adaptation division serves as a peculiar funnel for handling political conflicts surrounding Norway’s EU adaptation. It de facto directs attention to single issues or single pieces of EU legislation; there is no principled debate on the broader ramifications of how Europeanization transforms Norway and the political cost of this mode of affiliation membership. The critical question, “What Norway in what Europe?”, is never raised.

Depoliticization of affiliation has been considered necessary to sustain the consensual element of Norwegian politics. However, Norway has no real codetermination with its European neighbours. The Norway model leaves at most a very narrow channel for Norway to voice concerns. Norway’s inability to influence EU decisions – including EU influence on issue areas like agriculture that are explicitly excluded from cooperation in the initial EEA agreement – puts proponents of a strong EU affiliation in an awkward situation. Unlike member states that can claim victories in Brussels, Norway cannot explicitly bargain (even if the Norwegian delegation in Brussels successfully manages to make EU regulations more amenable to Norwegian conditions). Norway’s lack of political representation in the EU system also means that Norwegians are less clued into what goes on in the EU.

EU opponents, for their part, complain that Norway’s close EU affiliation effectively means that the referendum result is not respected. It is often said that those that voted No won on the day of the referendum but have lost every day since.

Under its EEA affiliation, political tensions and conflicts have to be worked out domestically, either through conflict avoidance or compensation for ill effects. The current combination of depoliticization and compensation is fragile. It presupposes that no external shock can upset the fragile compromise and the specific conditions that sustain this. Might Brexit be precisely such a shock?

From a democratic perspective, Norway’s experience accentuates the need to clarify the role of popular referendums in settling thorny questions of EU membership given deeply interwoven states. How long does a referendum result last? How suitable is a referendum for sorting among options? The 1994 Norwegian referendum question was unambiguous, but the binary referendum question – Yes or No to membership – was not in synch with the underlying options. There were three options: Yes to EU membership; No to EU membership but Yes to EEA; and No to EU membership and EEA. The third was not on the ballot, so the binary Yes/No referendum question could not resolve the strategic choices.

The obvious implication of Norway’s post-1994 history is that, if a referendum is to settle such questions, it is important to work out a viable relationship between a popular vote and parliamentary representation. Brexit shows that a referendum by itself cannot resolve divisions; Parliament has an inescapable role in resolving inevitable gaps. If referendums are to be added to the system of parliamentary government, the details need to be better worked out in democratic theory and practice.

Contemporary societies, it is often claimed, are marked by a “populist zeitgeist.”¹ Populism is a global phenomenon, but it comes in many forms and shapes. Even if populist parties and movements espouse views that tend to straddle the left-right dimension, it is common to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing versions of populism.²

European populist movements started out as fringe groups, but their views are today becoming part of the mainstream. With some exceptions, the trend is for established parties to move closer to populist positions, notably on immigration and cultural diversity. Moreover, populist support correlates with a significant decline in social democratic party support, as many populist parties fashion themselves as the real workers’ movements.³ In a number of cases, populists have entered governments or are wielding direct influence on governing parties, although it is only in eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland) that populists, of the right-wing variety, are running governments.

The European Union as populist target and as arena

The populists’ favourite target is the European Union (EU).⁴ Populists in Europe, and especially right-wing populists, are Eurosceptics or Europhobes, calling for dismantling the EU. The EU appears to fit the populist stereotype of an aloof elite disconnected from the people⁵: its movers and shakers are executives and experts, in charge of institutions without proper anchoring in the demos. Ironically, an important reason for that is the exceptional degree of member-state control of EU-level institutions, which places strong constraints on the EU, especially in fiscal matters. Populists actively seek to foster a contrast between what they portray as disloyal and morally corrupt EU and national elites on the one side, and themselves as the authentic expression of the peoples of Europe on the other. It appears that few political entities lend themselves better to that social construction than today’s EU.

But if the EU is a populist target, it also fosters populism. The EU level serves as an important arena and even launching pad for populist politics. In the last European Parliament (EP) elections, populist parties gained very strong support, in some cases far stronger than in their respective member states. The United Kingdom is a case in point. In the 2015 U.K. election, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) won 12.6 per cent of the vote, which gave it only one seat (out of 650) in the House of Commons. In the 2014 EP elections, UKIP gained 26.8 per cent of the vote, which gave it 24 seats (out of 751) in the European Parliament).⁶ U.K. elections are first-past-the-post, whereas EP elections are proportional. The far easier conversion of votes to seats at the EU level has enabled parties that were constrained by national electoral systems to build strength and visibility at the EU level and to convert that into domestic influence.

The EU level facilitates cross-national populist organizing and politics in Europe. Even though populists espouse strong (ethnic) nationalist views, European populism is becoming more transnational (in EP party groups, in contact patterns, in learning and in copying from one another). An interesting question is whether the transnational component is simply a means for improving national positions, or whether the parties might develop genuine transnational attitudes. Islamophobia might be one such trigger insofar as populists consider Europe (not simply the nation-state) as the natural unit to defend.

Populists use EU institutions as platforms, drawing on their resources to denounce the EU, often in utter disregard of what they have experienced at the EU level. The lines of attack follow the basic constructions of the world that populists operate in, and will be further illustrated below.

EU decision-making is typically consensus-seeking and draws heavily on expert knowledge. Both aspects run counter to populism, especially right-wing populism that focuses on strong and decisive leadership and has a strong authoritarian bent.⁷ Populists are quite prone to dismiss experts and expert knowledge, and seek to associate experts with the dreaded elite. In the European setting, this construction of a conflict between expertise and popular democracy has been facilitated by important changes in party systems. Many of Europe’s established parties are no longer embedded mass parties, making them appear to be closely linked to the state.⁸ These parties are easy targets of populist ire, construed as part of the technocratic elite, unresponsive to the national settings from where they stem.

The many crises of the EU

Populism thrives on crises. In that sense, contemporary Europe is fertile ground. The EU is still reeling from the aftereffects of the financial crisis and the Eurozone governance crisis. It faces a geopolitical crisis related to Russia’s resurgence as a power hostile to the EU’s interests, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, and to the EU’s weak ability to cope with the latest migration crisis. In addition, the EU has to confront the potential fallout and domino effects of the looming Brexit.

Populism figures centrally in all these challenges. The EU has instituted sanctions against Russia. Most populist parties want to abolish these sanctions because they have quite close links to Putin’s Russia. In some cases there is a direct financial element involved. In 2013, for instance, Russia’s First Czech-Russian Bank lent Marine Le Pen’s National Front €9.46 million to finance an election campaign. A survey conducted by the European Council of Foreign Relations found that in Western Europe, right-wing populist pro-Russian parties included Alternative for Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party, Golden Dawn (Greece) National Front (France), Northern League (Italy), UKIP and Vlaams Belang (Belgium). They also surveyed populist left-wing parties and concluded that AKEL (Cyprus), Die Linke (Germany), Podemos (Spain), Syriza (Greece) and the Italian Five Star Movement could be considered pro-Russian. The study underlines how these links have helped to legitimize Russian policies in the relevant countries, but the findings were not clear on the extent to which there was collusion.⁹

The financial crisis that turned into the Eurozone crisis has given added impetus to populism. In southern Europe, where the crisis hit the hardest, the main growth has been in left-wing populism. In northern Europe, the financial crisis did not have profound effects; the main surge has been in right-wing populism. An important factor stimulating growth in right-wing populist sentiment in northern Europe has been immigration, in particular the refugee crisis.

These patterns show that there is no direct link between magnitude of socioeconomic dislocation and support for right-wing populism. The Brexit story should not be read as an exception even though UKIP and the Leave campaign gained very strong support in deindustrialized regions. If we go back in time, we see that it is failure to act at the national level that underlies these developments: U.K. governments have tolerated what Simon Deakin described as “the shrinking of the industrial base, while actively encouraging the growth of a casualised labour market, characterized by growing self-employment (often a front for very insecure employment), agency work, and zero hours contracting. The result is the low-wage, low-productivity economy that the UK is rapidly becoming, and increasingly so since the crisis of 2008 revealed the structural weaknesses of the British economy.”¹⁰

The EU did little to reverse Thatcher-driven deindustrialization, nor did it inhibit member states such as Germany, the Nordic countries, the Low Countries and France from retaining their manufacturing base. UKIP’s Nigel Farage worked consistently and effectively at directing dissatisfaction at the specific target of the United Kingdom’s EU membership. He spent 25 years keeping the issue alive, nourishing it and actively and constantly looking for an opportunity or a political opening to bring this momentous change to fruition.¹¹ As Hanspeter Kriesi has noted, “There is nothing inevitable about the politicization of European integration. It takes partisan operators who are capable and willing to mobilize the latent structural potentials for euroscepticism to become politically and electorally relevant.”¹²

There is a broader issue pertaining to the relationship between populists and crises here. Populists do more than respond to crises; there is an intrinsic link between populism and crisis in the sense that populism actively seeks to construct and trigger crises. “While crisis may present an effective stage for populists,” Benjamin Moffitt writes in his book The Global Rise of Populism, “it is often the case that populists must play an important role in ‘setting the stage’ themselves.”¹³

Shifting the focus: Populists as authentic expressions of “the people”

It is common to highlight what populists are against, but it is equally important to pay attention to what are for. Key here is that they present themselves as the authentic expression of the people. In doing so populists skip quite gingerly over the central role that media play in this relationship. Once we recognize that there is a distinct political style intrinsic to populism, it becomes much easier to understand the close connection between modern populism and contemporary media developments. Moffitt notes that populism’s “appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’ and associated Others plays into media logic’s dramatization, polarization and prioritization of conflict; its ‘bad manners’ line up with media logic’s personalization, stereotypisation and emotionalisation; while its focus on crisis plays into media logic’s tendency towards intensification and simplification.”¹⁴

The emphasis on populism as a distinct style of politics helps to uncover the distinctive ways in which populists orchestrate themselves and their surroundings in the pursuit of their objectives. Populists have become increasingly skilled in working the media, in particular the new media. “Populists are not particularly keen to reveal the artifice behind their own media performances, nor the professional machinery behind them,” Moffitt writes, “given that much of their appeal stems from appearing to connect with ‘the people’ in an unmediated way that is different from ‘politics as usual.’”¹⁵

There is no such thing as an authentic representation of “the people.” If we are to move forward, if the values that have guided democratic development for three generations are to be sustained, we need to uncover and expose populist artifice and strategy, without underestimating the seriousness of the issues that these movements reflect. Continue reading “The European Union and the populist challenge” →