On September 20, South Africa’s Democratic Alliance named Helen Zille as its candidate for mayor of Johannesburg in the November 2026 local government elections, framing the contest as a choice “between decay and renewal.” Zille accepted the nomination and promised a reliable plan for water, electricity and refuse removal as well as providing safer streets, cleaning up procurement and tackling criminal networks, and enforcing bylaws to reduce cable theft and illegal connections. She has also highlighted the city’s infrastructure backlog. A strong mandate would end years of revolving-door mayors and give officials room to plan multiyear upgrades. It will take tighter finances, better maintenance and targeted capital projects to begin turning services around, fixing leaks, closing revenue gaps and accelerating repairs.

This local campaign has significance beyond South Africa’s largest city. We look at the current state of Johannesburg – and of South Africa more generally – and at the extraordinary career of Helen Zille.

Global – and local – inequality

At its annual meeting in Johannesburg in November 2025, the G20 launched a new “Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts,” commissioned by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and chaired by Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, which will deliver the first-ever report on global inequality to G20 world leaders. The experts will report on the state of wealth and income inequality – the world’s richest 1 per cent having increased their wealth by more than $33.9 trillion (USD) in real terms since 2015 – and its impact on growth, poverty and multilateralism, and set out effective solutions. As Stiglitz put it,

Inequality has widened to extremes that threaten democracy itself and should be a concern of all of us; the profound rise in the discontents of mismanaged globalization which in many places has contributed to this growth of inequality is also evident. Inequality was always a choice – and G20 nations have the power to choose a different path, on a range of economic and social policies.

In his address, President Ramaphosa noted,

People across the world know how extreme inequality undermines their dignity and chance for a better future. They saw the brutal unfairness of vaccine apartheid, where millions in the Global South were denied the vaccines to save them. They see the impacts of rising food and energy prices, of debt, of trade wars, all driving this growing gap between the rich and the rest of the world, undermining progress and economic dynamism. A new oligarchy in our global economy is becoming apparent.

Indeed, Ramaphosa can point to plenty of evidence of wealth inequality in his own backyard. South Africa’s democratic post-apartheid constitution enshrines social and economic as well as human and civic rights. The rule of law, an independent judiciary and freedom of the press are cornerstones. Despite the colonial history of extraction of natural resources and Black slavery, the British legacy of a parliamentary system remains very strong. But while post-apartheid democracy guarantees political equality, the economy is far from egalitarian. According to a recent study, only 23 per cent of the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are held – directly or indirectly – by Black South Africans. Moreover, capital, in its varied forms such as land, property and human capital, remains heavily skewed toward White ownership.

In a presentation to Parliament in January 2025, Dumisani Cebekhulu, business unit leader for the South African Auditor-General’s office in Gauteng Province where Johannesburg is located, expressed concern over the city’s stagnant audit outcomes and lack of improvement in financial management, noting:

• There has been poor revenue collection from major entities such as Joburg Water and City Power.
• Insufficient infrastructure investment has affected service delivery. “It is a city that is having serious challenges with regards to infrastructure,” said Cebekhulu. This “limits or affects the city as it relates to fulfilment of its mandate to provide services to the residents.”
• The closing balance on irregular expenditure has risen, increasing from 8.8 billion rand in 2019–20 to 11.1 billion rand in the 2022–23 financial year.¹ Of the total amount, 58 per cent had not been dealt with, 42 per cent was written off and no funds were recovered or condoned. According to Cebekhulu, “It is a city that has huge irregular expenditure and non-compliance issues.”
• In January 2025 the trusted Special Investigating Unit (SIU), led by Gauteng head Sagren Reddy, presented Parliament with its findings on the City of Johannesburg (CoJ). Reddy reported irregularities in a R9.1 million contract awarded to Fire Raiders for the procurement of 29 fire engines. Regarding the R10.6 million CCTV installation project for the City of Johannesburg’s emergency management services and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department, the SIU uncovered duplicate payments amounting to nearly R600,000. Despite this, Reddy concluded that no irregularities were found in the overall procurement process.

In contrast, in a scathing judgement, the Johannesburg High Court lambasted the City of Johannesburg for its “abuse of power” in handling customer disputes over billing and utility disconnections and its debt collection practices. Acting Judge C Badenhorst noted that CoJ’s actions often force customers into prolonged and expensive litigation, a burden many cannot afford. Yet despite such repeated court rulings, the city continues to deny legal accountability and its representatives continue to make baseless claims and further escalate disputes instead of resolving them, This indifference to accountability “undermines public trust in the administration.” The court demanded that CoJ attorneys and legal advisers justify their threats to disconnect utilities or face sanctions, including personal cost penalties.

The Zuma era and “state capture”

South African corruption reached its highest levels under the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–18), who was sentenced to jail for contempt of court for his refusal to testify before a Commission of Inquiry after being forced to resign. The Commission of Inquiry revealed billions of U.S. dollars lost because of “state capture,” the theft of government programs by the wealthy and influential Gupta brothers in collusion with Zuma and his officials. It also found that many well-respected and highly successful companies entered into kickback agreements to secure lucrative contracts. Auditors, bankers, lawyers and consultants were also complicit.

The total amount of money spent by the state that was “tainted” by state capture was estimated at around R57 billion, almost all through Transnet, responsible for the port, rail and pipeline network, and Eskom, responsible for the provision of electricity. The Gupta enterprise received at least R15 billion. The total loss to the state is difficult to quantify but certainly exceeds that amount.

In 2014, around 47 per cent of (mostly Black) South Africans continued to live in poverty, making South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world. Downtown buildings are often overcrowded and dangerous, with blocked fire exits and flimsy partitions made of combustible materials like plywood and fabric to separate large spaces into smaller rooms. Johannesburg officials have also been accused of failing to allocate enough funds for housing.

In August 2023, 77 people died and many more were injured after a fire gutted the Usindiso building in Johannesburg’s Marshalltown district, highlighting the deep housing inequalities in Africa’s wealthiest city, inequalities the authorities had promised to address. Following the fire, a commission of inquiry under Judge Sisi Khampepe inspected around 110 properties and concluded that the City of Johannesburg allowed the violation of public health bylaws, building regulations and all other steps that would otherwise have mitigated the impact of the fire. Almost 80 per cent of the properties surveyed had fire-safety concerns, and 71 per cent lacked any fire-safety equipment. Some 77 per cent of the properties did not have water, sanitation, refuse removal or electricity.

As the country faced continuing power cuts, soaring crime and stagnating growth, the African National Congress’s support dropped from 58 per cent in 2019 to 42 per cent in 2024, the first time the party failed to win a majority since Nelson Mendela was elected President in 1994. Under South Africa’s proportional electoral system, with only 42 per cent of the seats, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa, whose mandate ends in 2029, had little choice but to form a Government of National Unity with the Democratic Alliance (DA), which won 18 per cent, as well as several smaller parties.²

There is some hope that the coalition will move to address major issues related to health, poverty, economic development, crime, justice and the environment. If, as expected, ANC support further declines, the 2029 presidential election could lead to real progress in these areas. On the other hand, it could spark a pernicious, devastating slide to a failed state.

Helen Zille: Courageous journalist, accomplished politician

Helen Zille was born in 1951, the eldest child in a family which left Germany in the 1930s because her maternal grandfather and paternal grandmother were Jewish. She grew up in Rivonia, a middle-class Johannesburg suburb. Her mother was a volunteer in the Black Sash organization, an anti-apartheid nonviolent resistance movement of liberal White women, their black sashes expressing mourning for the South African constitution. After graduating from the University of Witwatersrand, Helen Zille joined the youth movement of the liberal and anti-apartheid Progressive Party. She became a reporter at the Rand Daily Mail newspaper in 1974.

On August 18, 1977, Steve Biko and a fellow anti-apartheid activist were seized at a roadblock in Port Elizabeth and jailed. Biko was found naked and shackled outside a hospital in Pretoria, 1,200 kilometres away, on September 11 and died the next day of a massive brain hemorrhage. Biko had cofounded the all-Black South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) in 1968 and had become its first president the following year. SASO encouraged Blacks to recognize their inherent dignity and self-worth. In the 1970s the Black Consciousness Movement spread to urban Black communities throughout South Africa. In 1973 Biko and other SASO members were banned; their associations, movements and public statements were restricted. Biko continued to act covertly to help political prisoners and their families. He was arrested four times over the next two years and held without trial for months at a time.

After Biko’s death, the South African Minister of Justice and the Police, J.Y. Kruger, announced that he had died in prison as the result of an extended hunger strike. Helen Zille and her editor, Allister Sparks, were convinced Kruger’s story was a cover-up, and Zille obtained concrete proof of this after tracking down and interviewing doctors involved in the case.³ Zille received death threats, and a quasi-judicial Press Council found her and Sparks guilty of “tendentious reporting.” Kruger threatened to ban the newspaper. Zille and Sparks resigned after the paper’s owner, the omnipresent Anglo American, demanded that Sparks abandon the paper’s equal rights stance.

Helen Zille’s courageous reporting on Steve Biko’s murder foreshadowed her values throughout her life in the struggle to bring radical change to the newly democratic South Africa. She served on the regional and national executives of the Black Sash movement during the 1980s. In 1982 she married Johann Maree, professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Cape Town, and they have two sons. The couple offered their home as a safe house for political activists during the 1986 State of Emergency, and she was temporarily forced into hiding with their two-year-old son.

Serving as Director of Development and Public Affairs at the University of Cape Town, Zille was invited by the Democratic Party (now the Democratic Alliance) to write a draft policy for education in the Western Cape. In 1999 she became a member of the Western Cape Provincial Legislature and was appointed to its Executive Committee for education. In 2004 she became a DA member of the National Parliament, rising to deputy federal chairperson and national party spokesperson. In the 2006 municipal elections, the DA emerged as the largest party in Cape Town with 42 per cent of the vote, ahead of the ANC. Zille was elected Mayor by 106 votes to 103 on March 15 after the DA obtained the support of several smaller parties.

As Mayor, she revoked the appointment of the Cape Town city manager named by her predecessor, and prevented the Cape Town ANC from diluting the power of the mayor’s office. Zille opposed plans to incorporate the metro police into the broader police service, arguing that such a move would remove considerable power from local government and vest more control in the hands of the then–National Police Commissioner, who was later convicted of corruption.

Collaborating with local communities, she demanded more government funding for drug rehabilitation centres to battle drug abuse and worked to improve sanitation, electricity and housing. When South Africa was awarded the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Zille reluctantly agreed to the construction of a controversial new 68,000-seat stadium on a scenic site near downtown between the mountain and the sea, though she contended that the money could be better spent on helping poor Cape Town citizens. She attached the condition that the national government pay most of the $420 million cost, so that “we cannot end up with a situation like in Montreal when the grandchildren of the people who made the decisions for the 1976 Olympics are still paying the bill.”

In 2007, while remaining Mayor of Cape Town, Zille was elected to head the Democratic Alliance nationwide, replacing Tony Leon, its founding leader. The DA program included reinstating child protection units, the South African Narcotics Bureau and the Scorpions unit responsible for investigating high-profile cases, notably an arms deal in which high-ranking ANC politicians were implicated. The DA proposed boosting the size of the police force, improving detention programs and the use of information technology, and radically overhauling the justice system. Having been arrested and acquitted several times, Zille knew firsthand the need for judicial independence.

Taking on drug abuse was a priority. Zille warned against the controversial National Health Amendment Bill, a statute that would allow greater state intervention in private health care, raising the possibility that the bill could drive away thousands of skilled medical professionals. Together with her party she proposed an alternative approach to the privatization of state health care.

The 2009 general election presented Zille with her first major electoral contest as leader of the DA and its candidate for Premier of the Western Cape. Her party won with 51.46 per cent of the province’s vote, and she was reelected to a second term in 2014. The Democratic Alliance retained its majority for a third term, though she left office since a premier could only serve two terms.

On to Johannesburg

Zille was elected Federal Council Chairperson of the DA, a role akin to a party secretary-general, in 2019, a time when the party was undergoing a period of electoral decline, of “distress and political turmoil” as she put it. She was reelected to the position in April 2023, and two years later announced her candidacy for mayor of Johannesburg, with its population of over six million, the most challenging position in her long career.

The Democratic Alliance has held the Johannesburg mayoral post twice, its most recent victory coming in January 2023. Because no party has a majority, there have been nine mayors in the last six years from the DA, the ANC and a third party, a situation in which corrupt practices flourish as one regime gives way to the next.

In announcing her candidacy, Zille insisted that even under the DA Johannesburg was ineffectively run. With an infrastructure backlog of R200 billion, an annual budget of R86 billion and a workforce that has grown by 86 per cent since 2010, it would take more than five years to turn the city around. But she could do this, she insisted, pointing to her experience as Mayor of Cape Town, turning that city around while urban blight was settling in, as well as Premier of the Western Cape. To stabilize the city’s finances and restore service delivery, she would appoint qualified people to key roles though, she added, civil society will have to be a crucial partner in this process. Indeed, she would try to attract some of those who moved abroad to return and contribute.

Helen Zille knows that winning in metro Johannesburg will be hard. Voters are used to parties operating in fragile, inefficient alliances. As the 2026 race nears, the campaign will therefore court undecided voters with promises of dependable services, cleaner streets and fiscal discipline. This is the DA’s appeal to its base in the more affluent suburbs originally built by Whites and more integrated today.

Polls tend to give an edge to the ANC because it is dominant in the Black townships. Helen Zille will need to make inroads into that base in the months to come. She has met tough challenges before. This will be the toughest.

Continue reading “Helen Zille’s toughest challenge” →

On August 16 the South African Police Service killed 34 mineworkers, injured 78 and arrested 270 others who had gathered on a rocky outcrop a 90-minute drive from Johannesburg near the Marikana Platinum Mine owned by Lonmin Plc. A week earlier, ten other people died: six mine workers, two security guards and two policemen.

The deaths of 44 people sparked shock, dismay and profound soul-searching throughout South Africa. In 2010, South Africa took so much pride in hosting the 2010 World Cup of soccer, seeing it as an example of what can be done when everyone works together. Now the country has been forced to look at its darkest side and assess how far it has moved toward the aspirations expressed by Nelson Mandela in 1994 when he became the first black president and the first to be elected by a majority: “We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination.”

Underlying the tragedy brought on by the working conditions and violent protests there is something deeper. The Marikana crisis is a wake-up call bringing to the foreground the challenges from the nation’s impoverished majority, and the unfinished promises to that majority. If left unresolved, these issues will imperil democracy, the rule of law and the hard-won civic, social and economic rights enshrined in the South African constitution.

A crucial industry

The South African Department of Mineral Resources acknowledged that there were 127 deaths in the mining industry in 2011 due to “falling of ground.” This was 25 fewer deaths than in the previous year. In addition, there are high incidences of silicosis, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

South Africa’s economy is the largest on the African continent – 32.7 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP in 2011, according to the World Bank – and mining is its cornerstone. The mining industry currently employs 500,000 people. It has had a crucial political and economic impact on the growth of the country since the discovery of gold and diamonds in the mid-nineteenth century. Mining represents 6 per cent of South Africa’s economy – down from 21 per cent in 1970, but still almost 60 per cent of export revenue, according to South Africa’s National Development Plan.

There has been a worldwide boom in commodities since the year 2000, with growth of 5 per cent a year in the 20 largest producing countries. South African production actually declined by 1 per cent a year during this period, a missed opportunity to grow the economy.

Platinum is a precious metal used as a catalytic converter in automobile exhaust systems to reduce harmful pollutants. It is also used in laboratory and dental equipment and jewellery. South Africa produces upwards of 80 per cent of the world’s supply and is estimated to have more than 90 per cent of the known global reserves. Different estimates in the National Development Plan foresee growth of between 100,000 and 300,000 jobs over the next 10 to 12 years, based primarily on platinum mining.

A history of mining conflicts

After World War I the mine owners, through their Chamber of Mines and supported by the government, decided to increase their use of cheaper black unskilled labour. This had a major impact on the white mineworkers who earned seven to ten times more. Blacks and whites formed separate unions and organized at cross-purposes. The historic confrontation with the white unions was the 1922 Rand General Strike which saw 81 workers, 43 soldiers and 29 policemen killed and more than 650 people injured. Charges were laid against 853 people, of which 46 were for murder. Eighteen were sentenced to death, though public reaction led to 14 being reprieved.

The African Mine Workers Union was created in 1941, backed by a broad coalition seeking to promote and defend the interest of the black mineworkers. The Chamber of Mines refused to recognize the union, and trouble with the workers brewed. Prime Minister Jan Smuts marginally increased wage levels, reimbursing the mine owners by transferring back taxes. He also invoked War Measures to prevent gatherings of more than 20 people on mining property.

In 1946 a major confrontation with the black miners took place. Of the 400,000 workers on the Reef in Johannesburg, 70,000 went on strike demanding an increase from two shillings to 12 shillings, paid two-week leave and family housing. The strike was brutally put down after a week, with nine deaths and several hundred injuries. As he later wrote in his autobiography Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela, then a rising activist in the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League, “was impressed by the organisation of the union and its ability to control its membership.” Nevertheless, the Smuts government managed to smash the union, and 52 men were prosecuted for incitement and sedition, resulting in fines and imprisonment.

Two decades later, the National Party, which ruled South Africa during the apartheid period from 1948 to 1994, passed legislation allowing the black mineworkers to unionize. Created in 1982, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) is today the largest trade union in South Africa, having expanded to the platinum mining, construction and electricity industries and the public service. In the 1980s migrant mineworkers lived far away from their families for 11 months of the year, in compounds of cramped large dormitories with 10 to 20 beds in each room. These quarters were isolated from nearby towns and cities so that the white mine owners and the state could control the workers’ movements. But bringing them together in these compounds also, ironically, facilitated NUM’s efforts to organize the workers for better working conditions and recruit them into the struggle against the apartheid system.

Over the years, former NUM members came to play prominent societal roles. Some became shop stewards in the mines, advanced into skilled labour positions previously restricted to whites and served as elected councillors and mayors in their communities. Former general secretaries of NUM include Kgalema Motlanthe, once Secretary General of the African National Congress and currently Deputy President of the country; Gwede Mantashe, once Chairman of the South African Communist Party and currently Secretary General of the ANC; and Cyril Ramaphosa, who headed up the ANC negotiating team at the end of apartheid and became a very wealthy businessman – with holdings including an equity stake in the ownership of the Marikana platinum mine.

In 1999 close to 3,000 mineworkers quit NUM to form the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), which was officially recognized in 2002. AMCU’s leader, Joseph Mathunjwa, was drummed out of NUM by the then General Secretary, Gwede Mantashe, for having brought “disrepute on the union.” AMCU is more militant than NUM and has made significant inroads in recruiting members away from it. It is alleged that AMCU has encouraged the Marikana workers to go on wildcat strikes.

Living and working conditions

There is still much uncertainty as to just what happened at Marikana. President Jacob Zuma appointed a commission within a week of the tragedy, and observers hope that it will sort out the facts. What is known is that the miners went out on strike, at the risk of losing their employment, for a base monthly salary before benefits of R12,500 (about C$1,500), two to three times the amount they currently receive.

While there are differing portrayals of their living and working conditions, a helpful source of information on the platinum mines is the Bench Marks Foundation, a faith-based organization chaired by the Anglican Bishop of Pretoria, Dr. Jo Seoka. Bishop Seoka has been one of the participants in negotiations between the strikers and Lonmin following the Marikana events. The Foundation’s Policy Gap Number Six, published in 2012, reports that Lonmin employs 23,915 employees permanently, the majority of them at Marikana. Lonmin also has 9,131 full-time contractors, a drop of slightly more than 1,000 from 2009. Thus, roughly one third of employees are subcontractors.

Subcontracted workers are usually poorly paid, poorly trained and educated and poorly accommodated. They also lack long-term familiarity with the work environment and culture, being highly mobile between jobs. Their presence therefore compromises the health and safety of other workers. There were three fatalities in the Marikana mines in 2010, and before year end in 2011 there had been six fatalities.

According to Nerine Khan, Director of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), an independent dispute resolution body established under the Labour Relations Act, the Marikana workers do not trust the unions and are now represented “to a certain degree” by the clergy.

Where do we go from here?

Lonmin agreed to significant wage increases of 11 to 22 per cent, which led to wildcat strikes, lockouts and even firings in other platinum and gold mines, where mineworkers have been demanding similar gains. Business and government initially supported the agreement, but there are fears that the reputation of an industry fundamental to the South African economy will be irreparably damaged. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), NUM and the ANC at first criticized the agreement because it circumvented the collective bargaining process and would encourage others to do the same. Subsequent meetings between the unions and the Chamber of Mines may result in increases for the lower rungs of unskilled labour across the mining industry, as well as commitments to improve the social conditions of the workers.

The Commission of Inquiry named by President Zuma was given a broad mandate, to look into the conduct of Lonmin Plc, the South African Police Services, two rival unions (AMCU and NUM) and their respective members and officials, the Department of Mineral Resources and any other government departments or agencies. The commission will also look into the conduct of individuals and loose groupings in fomenting and/or promoting a situation of conflict and confrontation which may have given rise to the incident.

The government has voiced concerns about outside “instigators” who have gained the confidence of the mineworkers. The “instigator” who has received the most public attention is Julius Malema, a 30-year old populist and former ANC Youth League President. Malema, once a political ally of President Zuma, was expelled from the ANC in April 2012 for having brought disrepute to the party. The mineworkers have greeted him warmly, and he has called on the workers to make the country “ungovernable,” while telling the domestic and international media that he favours nationalization of the mines. Several weeks after the Marikana incident, Malema was charged with 16 counts of alleged “money laundering.”

All of this plays out against the political background of the December 2012 leadership conference and the question of whether President Zuma will be the party’s nominee for a second term. Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe is the likely challenger, but he has not played his hand.

The commission is expected to focus on the issue of violence and whether the police response was appropriate. Many questions await responses. On the fateful day of August 16 many mineworkers had homemade spears, sticks and machetes. Who supplied these weapons and what were their motives? Why were the police shooting live ammunition instead of water cannons, rubber bullets and stun grenades? The mineworkers and supporters were not gathering in a public place where passersby were present. Did the police feel threatened, and if so why did the police not simply retreat? Between 2008 and 2010, police killed 1,092 people in the exercise of their duties across South Africa. Is there a “law and order” mentality that has gotten out of hand?

But there are a number of wider and more profound questions that the commission’s mandate does not appear to cover. The answers to these questions will prove crucial to the economic and political future of South Africa:

• The mines are critical for the South African economy and platinum is coming to occupy the preeminent place once held by gold. Platinum prices have gone as high as US$2,000 an ounce and fell to $1,400 before rising again in the wake of the Marikana tragedy. Some experts as well as mining companies suggest that there is enough supply to satisfy the demand even with the mine closings. If that is the case, will the mining companies reopen once stability is restored? Given the small number of decision makers in the industry, are there institutional arrangements in place to ensure fair play in pricing and labour relations over the long term?
• What are the roles, responsibilities and commitments of the key nongovernment stakeholders (mine owners, financial institutions, unions, traditional leaders, community organizations, churches, nonprofit organizations) to improve the living, working and overall socioeconomic conditions of the working poor in the short, medium and long term?
• What can be done to redress poverty and unemployment in South Africa, and the related inequality between rich and poor, which according to the World Bank report in 2011 is the greatest in the world?

A “Walk Together” approach

These are difficult questions to which there are no simple answers. But South Africa’s new democracy cannot afford the luxury of ignoring them. Mamphela Ramphele, herself a moral icon of the struggle as a leading activist in the Black Consciousness Movement, a PhD in social anthropology and the recent founder of Citizens Movement, articulated the challenge at the Carnegie3 Conference in September 2012 where she focused on the historic alignment between the political elites and the “Captains of Industry” and its effect on poverty and inequality. She concluded her remarks as follows:

We need a new approach that binds citizens, the government and the private sector in a “Walk Together” approach for a more equal society. Citizens must hold those in the government accountable at all levels, but many need to be enabled through vigorous civic education. Government must return to serving the public and not feed the greed that is driving corruption and failure to regulate and manage the socioeconomic system effectively and efficiently. The private sector must take a longer-term view of its best interests and use its considerable skills and economic muscle to tackle the skills crisis that is robbing young people of hope about a future that is inclusive.

SIDEBAR 1

The Bench Marks Foundation’s research team visits to Marikana concluded that the residential conditions of Lonmin and other mine company employees were appalling: “This can be seen in the proliferation of shacks and informal settlements, the rapid deterioration of formal infrastructure and housing in Marikana itself, and the fact that a section of the township constructed by Lonmin did not have electricity for more than a month during the time of the last visit. At the RDP Township we found broken down drainage systems spilling directly into the river at three different points. Residents informed the Bench Marks Foundation team that they have been reporting the matter to both the Local Government and Lonmin for five years now, and it still remains unaddressed. The Bench Marks Foundation team interviewed residents living next to the spills and found that children showed symptoms of chronic illnesses associated with such spills …

“The Bench Marks Foundation is also concerned about the appearance of bilharzia warning signs appearing next to surface water streams in Marikana. The presence of bilharzia in the surface water is a direct consequence of informal settlements, a major cause of which is the housing policies of mining companies, and failure to maintain and repair sewage and drainage systems by Local Government.”

SIDEBAR 2

The National Deputy President of South Africa, Kgalema Motlanthe, worked for ten years for NUM before becoming Secretary General of the ANC. In a recent address he offered this analysis:

“Rock drillers are an important category in the production chain of a mine. If there is no drilling, if they don’t drill, all other operations are superfluous. And yet they are regarded as unskilled labour. They don’t even have to know the depth of the holes they drill, that’s determined by the length of the bit. But the work that is regarded as skilled labour is work that is done by geologists, people who are trained … So these workers do that single work of drilling, in the olden days they did exactly that same work for 17 up to 20 years, so they gain job-specific experience and so they can’t be transferred or promoted to other areas, but they know one thing and that is that if they don’t drill there is no production. So if you get to them and say ‘well you are underpaid, withdraw your labour power,’ they will go along with that.”

Although mine workers are given a housing allowance, most of them send the money back home and live in shacks in the worst conditions imaginable. Motlanthe alleged that there are dark forces of small secret groupings of four to five people who have conspired to mobilize the Marikana workers through a ritualistic process involving the killing of someone in order to generate a “trance”-like state of mind, procure weapons and lead the process to mobilize the workers to go on strike.

He also referred to the “stratified” relationship between unskilled labourers such as the rock drillers and their union representatives who negotiate on their behalf: “All of the shop stewards who get elected and are also full-time shop stewards, are the most articulate, they earn better, so when they negotiate, invariably they are likely to sign once the percentage offered makes sense to them as individuals, and so the lower rung has no voice, and their interests are only addressed in mass meetings.”

The new South Africa’s first fifteen years

It is almost 15 years since the African National Congress took power in South Africa – a good time to assess what has been accomplished, what has not been accomplished and what just might be accomplished. Here I follow these paths through several territories: political reform; economic policy; health, especially the HIV-AIDS pandemic; housing; crime and corruption; and foreign policy. Though hardly definitive, these fields together provide an overview of a remarkable story.

In a sense, it is a blend of two stories. On the one hand there is the ANC inspirational version: the transformation of a society historically based on systemic race-driven discrimination that made South Africa a pariah among nations, a democratic revolution that brought the excluded majority to power within the framework of a progressive constitution. And indeed, many positive changes have taken place for which South Africans can rightly be very proud. But the second story is one of disappointments. Many South Africans are angry and feel betrayed by the failures of the new government. Overall, we get a picture of a democracy that is still fragile, sometimes messy, yet all in all a potential vehicle for peaceful social change for citizens willing to exercise their prerogatives.

The political transformation

On April 27, 1994, all South Africans were able to vote for the first time. Overwhelmingly, they endorsed the multiracial Government of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela. The new nation of South Africa was born. Years of apartheid and brutal social and economic injustice were behind it. Under the new interim constitution, the country was embarking, full of hope, on an era of political, social and economic development.

Election day in South Africa ended a tragic history of colonial rule stretching back to 1652. It happened because both Nelson Mandela, his ANC having consolidated mass support, and outgoing President Frederik de Klerk knew that neither side could impose its will by force. Beyond seeking to avert a terrible bloodbath, they could see that international sanctions were draining the economy and the business community was losing confidence.

During the negotiations leading up to the elections, Mandela was able to prevail on the principles of elections based on one person one vote, decisions in cabinet to be taken with a simple majority of 50 per cent plus one, and a Bill of Rights entrenching civil liberties in a permanent constitution still to be drafted. To allay fears in the White community, the Bill of Rights entrenched property rights, established a power-sharing arrangement for five years and guaranteed employment or retirement compensation to the police, military and civil servants. Although there would be no general amnesty, there would also be no “Nuremburg-style” trials. Instead, there would be a Truth and Reconciliation Commission: those who told the truth about their crimes, so that victims’ families could come to terms with the loss of their loved ones, could apply for amnesty.

Mandela’s cabinet included Blacks, Indians, Coloureds, Muslims, Christians and Jews – in marked departure from the Afrikaner apartheid governments that had ruled South Africa since 1948. De Klerk’s National Party held five cabinet positions, including his own as one of two Deputy Presidents. Chief Mongosuthu Buthelezi’s Inthaka Freedom Party (IFP) had been put on the ballot at the last minute and he was made Minister of Home Affairs. Thabo Mbeki, ANC Deputy President (and eventually Mandela’s successor), assumed the de facto position of prime minister with a key role in running the day-to-day business of government.

ANC cadres shared the cabinet table with people who would have had – indeed did have – them arrested for their political activities. Mandela at age 71 had walked out to freedom on February 11, 1990, after spending 27 years in prison. On that day he addressed a jubilant gathering in Cape Town: “I stand before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you the people. Your timeless and heroic struggles have made it possible for me to be here today. I therefore place the remaining years of my life in your hands.” Four years later they made him their president.

Managing the economy

Nelson Mandela knew that there would be scepticism about the ANC’s capacity to assume the task of managing the economy, and its readiness to do so was a major concern for him. The scepticism was driven by sometimes racist anxieties in the domestic and international business communities that the ANC would seek to redress the injustices of apartheid with state-imposed quick fixes that would undermine financial stability.

The fundamental issue then, as it still is today, was White domination of the South African economy, the enduring legacy of colonialism and apartheid. Blacks could not own real estate throughout most of the 20th century, and were thus denied access to a key generator of assets that middle-class families pass on from one generation to another. It was difficult to own businesses, let alone trade in the White areas, which made up 87 per cent of the country. Pass laws and designated areas had been devised to provide cheap labour for the mines and farms; laws restricted access to skilled jobs and professions; the education system deliberately prepared Blacks for low-skilled jobs. Poor transportation and access to housing, water and electricity made daily life a struggle for survival.

The ANC knew that overcoming this legacy would take time and effort. From exile, ANC President Oliver Tambo had engaged directly with the nongovernmental White South African business community since the mid-eighties. The ANC assembled an expert team of economists, not all of whom were South Africans. Among them were Thabo Mbeki, who had a master’s degree in economics from the University of Sussex, and Tito Mboweni, named in 1999 as the first Black Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, who had received his master’s in development economics at the University of East Anglia. Several, including Mbeki, had also spent time in eastern Europe studying and experiencing the Soviet system.

A conscious decision was made to reject the state-socialist model in favour of a market-oriented approach guided by the objectives of social democracy. The aim was to gradually reduce the inequality that gave South Africa one of the highest Gini coefficient scores in the world. Lessons on social policy were drawn from Sweden, northern Europe and Canada, while east Asia was looked to for economic policies.

Three key programs have steered ANC economic policy: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). The RDP came out of a consensus-building process beginning with regional workshops throughout the country organized by the ANC with its partners in the governing Alliance – the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – as well as other civil society groups. The RDP formed the core of the 1994 ANC election manifesto, with specific commitments to the building of one million houses for the poor and access to water, electricity, education and health.

The RDP combined state interventionism with fiscal conservatism, linking growth, development and redistribution. The economy was to grow from increased domestic demand including that of the poor, and export expansion based on product competitiveness. A commitment was made to sound fiscal management by financing redistribution not through new unsustainable taxes but through increasing government revenues resulting from economic growth, as well the cutting of other expenditures, most notably the defence budget – thus preempting the demands of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The ANC government broke with important SACP and COSATU elements when it introduced the GEAR program in 1996 to replace the RDP. This time, there were no “bottom-up” consultations, but only limited “top-down” consultations by Deputy President Mbeki with senior leaders of the Alliance. GEAR set targets on government expenditures, with a 3 per cent ceiling on the budget deficit and limited wage increases. It aimed at privatization and liberalized trade. The years that followed saw much development based on public-private partnerships and free trade agreements negotiated with the EU and other countries. An agreement was signed with the United States to encourage African imports. The rand started to stabilize in the early 2000s.

These policies coincided with an affirmative action policy known as Black Economic Empowerment. (“Black” is defined as including Africans, Coloureds and Indians, i.e. all non-Whites). Targets were set in terms of ownership of companies, management positions and access to services, although the approach was a very gradual one. The result is visible in the form of a Black middle class, known as the Black Diamonds. They have jobs, drive nice cars (a third of all the cars sold in the country in 2007 were to Blacks), wear fine clothes and jewellery, carry the latest cell phones and iPods and fill the restaurants and nightclubs. As they move into middle-class suburbs, GDP grows – as does consumer debt.

But the Gini hasn’t budged noticeably: there is still a huge gap between the haves and the have-nots. Only now there are starting to be Blacks on the have side. Unemployment remains stuck at 25 per cent, not including people who have given up looking for work. An underclass is trapped in the “second economy” of subsistence agriculture, hawking, begging and crime, though it has generated some striking examples of entrepreneurship: for less than a dollar, young men watch your car while you eat in a restaurant, or people with large garbage bags in intersections help you clean out your car. Every person with means thus expects to continually contribute to the informal economy, not to mention employing maids and gardeners who support whole families on what they are paid.

It is one thing to talk of statistics and the second economy. There are also facts on the ground. It sometimes takes a visitor to bring it into focus, like a Canadian architect friend who couldn’t find the words to describe the miserable conditions of men, women and children living in the squalor of a squatter settlement in Johannesburg.

Health and HIV-AIDS

In 1994 South Africa’s health system had two parallel sectors: a public sector financed through general taxation for the majority and a private sector funded mainly through user premiums for a minority able to pay. The system continues to this day, even though health care was enshrined as a right in the 1996 constitution and completely reorganized. Spending on health care has increased, but the patient pool has increased much faster and the supply of qualified doctors and nurses has gone down.

The HIV-AIDS pandemic completely overwhelmed the system and its response capacity. Initially, programming was limited to voluntary preventive programs – educational campaigns, condom distribution, control of sexually transmitted diseases and counselling and testing. However, in the face of growing international and national pressure and a Constitutional Court ruling provoked by a South African nongovernmental organization, the Treatment Action Committee, the government was compelled to implement antiretroviral (ARV) treatment in 2002 for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission. UNAIDS reports that ARV therapy is now accessible through a network of clinics, but in 2005 only 23 per cent of HIV-infected men and women received the therapy. Moreover, about 5.5 million South Africans are living with HIV (worldwide the number is 33.2 million). This includes 18.8 per cent of adults aged 15 to 49. With 1,000 deaths a day, South Africa is home to the largest number of infected people on the whole planet. Among 15- to 24-year-old pregnant women, figures from antenatal clinics show rates around 30 per cent. A whole generation of orphans is being raised by grandparents, their parents dead of AIDS.

The devastating HIV-AIDS pandemic is the great failure of these first years of democracy. When the World Health Organization assessed the performance of its health system in 2000, South Africa was ranked 175th out of 191 countries. It was ranked 121st out of 177 countries on the 2007–8 UN Human Development Index, which measures well-being in terms of income, life expectancy and adult literacy.

It’s more than numbers – the plague is omnipresent. A colleague whispers to you that his sister died of the dreaded disease without mentioning its name. Another tells you she lost a relative and you do not ask from what. You go a funeral of a colleague, who did not die of AIDS; there are six open graves next to hers and you are told they will be all filled by the weekend.

There is no excuse for the political leaders who have failed abjectly to protect the people’s health – from the Minister of Health’s well publicized suggestion that the cure lies in beetroot and garlic to President Mbeki’s suggestion that this is a plot to demean Blacks. But the reality on the ground is another matter. An important breakthrough in removing the stigma came when Nelson Mandela joined the international public campaign, openly sharing his grief when his son died of AIDS. Now condoms are distributed at the workplace and commemorative candles are on display at the reception area. Every week there are new photos of recently deceased staff or relatives, their emaciated faces telling the story. The minister of the Provincial Housing Department exhorts her staff to use condoms. A vigorous education campaign includes graphic billboards, signs in public washrooms and even comic books.

Housing

The ANC put housing at the centre of its election platform in 1994, with its promise to build one million houses in five years. Although it took eight years, under the circumstances it is a major achievement. To date more than two million houses have been built and given free to the people. Yet the backlog is even greater, resulting largely from an unanticipated decrease in household size in response to the small size of the houses given away, higher disposable income and the promise of new homes.

Housing expansion has been facilitated by a parallel record of accomplishment in infrastructure. The number of households with access to clean water rose from 60 per cent in 1996 to 92 per cent in 2005, and electrification from 32 to 80 per cent, though the pace has been much slower in rural areas.

The South African constitution enshrines the right to housing, to be realized progressively as resources become available. The Constitutional Court has gone on record that it will hold the state accountable for providing plans and programs to house the poor and vulnerable, and engaging with them meaningfully in their implementation.

Housing policy is framed by national legislation and guidelines. The provinces receive an “equitable share” of national budget transfers to implement their social responsibilities such as housing, although they can set their spending priorities among a range of national policies and programs. Local governments have an independent tax base to fund housing, which complements their constitutional responsibility for development planning; zoning; providing water, roads and electricity; and leveraging public land for development purposes.

For three levels of government in South Africa to work closely together, even with the same party in power, can be challenging administratively, something I have experienced on a daily basis. Overall, that experience reveals that housing and social policies are well developed for delivering programs to improve people’s lives, especially those of the poor. Getting the houses actually built has proven much more difficult. Government has been significantly transformed since 1994, both politically and administratively. It is now multiracial at all levels and mirrors the society it serves, a radical departure from the pre-1994 years. There is a new buzz in government. Ordinary citizens now meet officials who talk to them in their own language, are generally sensitive to their diverse cultures, and treat them with dignity as they explain to them how government works, what their rights are and what process to follow.

This transformation has brought many new people into the public service and it will take time to achieve administrative maturity. Decisions are often too centralized, delays are frustrating and reporting requirements take precedence over results. Nevertheless, expertise and capability are increasing among public officials, and they can count on some strong delivery agencies and professionals outside government.

Crime and corruption

South Africa has become notorious for its crime: 18,545 murders in 2005, 20,553 attempted murders and nearly 55,000 reported rapes. Although the rates were down from 2001, the rate of reduction was less than the annual 7–10 per cent target set by the government. The “hot spots” for crime are in the poorest townships. For middle-class Black and White South Africans, fear of crime is contributing to an exodus of skilled professionals. They live behind high walls with 24/7 alarm protection. They do not walk the streets after dark. Women driving alone at night do not stop at red lights. You start to take for granted that much of the city you live in is closed to you – just too dangerous.

Part of the problem lies in law enforcement. It does not help that the head of the South African Police Service, Jackie Selebi, was recently charged with corruption and undermining the ends of justice. A special unit called the “Scorpions” was established to fight corruption and organized crime. The Scorpions conduct their own investigations and have led major prosecutions of politically sensitive matters. These include the use of false travel vouchers by members of Parliament as well as the multibillion-rand arms deal in the nineties involving French, British and German suppliers, which implicated then–Deputy President Jacob Zuma and led to the conviction of Schabir Shaik who was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for fraud and corruption regarding payments he made to Zuma. The head of the Scorpions, Vusi Pikoli, was suspended in September 2007, reportedly for not being aggressive enough in the corruption charges levelled against Jacob Zuma and for obtaining a search warrant against Jackie Selebi. These are very sensitive cases that are testing the political and judicial system, and the net may widen to others in high places as trials proceed and investigations continue in South Africa and in the countries where the arms originated.

Foreign policy

The new government signalled major potential changes in the way South Africa would relate to the rest of the world. It would support democratization as the cornerstone of building stability and economic opportunity. As Nelson Mandela noted when he addressed the U.S. Congress soon after taking office, democracies do not go to war with each other.

Historically, White South Africa was closer to Europe than to Africa. Relations with other countries in Africa under the apartheid government were often hostile and led to wars in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere. The new South African government quickly took an approach centred on the peaceful development of the continent. Early experiences revealed to the new leadership that there was very little to gain and much to lose by acting unilaterally.

In the first of these experiences, during the Commonwealth Conference in November 1995, Mandela intervened to try to prevent the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in Nigeria. But the hanging went ahead, and when Mandela publicly asked for oil sanctions against Nigeria and its expulsion from the Commonwealth, economic interests of other Commonwealth members prevailed, and Mandela felt betrayed. Interestingly, Thabo Mbeki counselled against this strategy, foreshadowing his much more gradualist, behind-the-scenes approach after he succeeded Mandela as president.

South Africa has since become very careful not to take sides in internal disputes, instead trying to set an example of resolving conflict through national unity government, reconciliation, democratization and coordinated social and economic development. These efforts were deployed for Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, with uneven success. The behind-the-scenes approach has been much tested in Zimbabwe, a failed state that sits on South Africa’s northern border, where Mbeki was named by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate between the government and the opposition.

Overall, South Africa has positioned itself as a solid middle power, with Mbeki playing a leading role in the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Mandela was a world-revered statesman, and Mbeki has moved very comfortably on the world stage from Davos to the G-7 summits. World sports are an important symbol. Mandela donned the green jersey when South Africa won the World Cup of rugby in 1995, a feat subsequently repeated in 2007. Once a pariah excluded from international sports, in 2010 South Africa will proudly host the World Cup of soccer. Everyone knows how important it will be to stage the World Cup successfully and, in particular, to ensure the safety of millions of visitors.

Where is South Africa headed?

The president is elected for five years and, according to the constitution, holds office for a maximum of two terms. Nelson Mandela stepped down in 1999 after one term. Thabo Mbeki’s second term will end in April 2009. The succession process began publicly almost from the moment that his second term started.

Mbeki was embarrassed in December 2007 when Jacob Zuma defeated him in his bid for a third term as party president. This confirmed the schism that has split the ANC for many years, starting with the debate over management of the economy. The succession battle has been an acrimonious one ever since Mbeki fired Zuma as Deputy President of the country in 2005. Zuma has since been acquitted of a rape charge, but he is scheduled to go on trial for corruption in August. If convicted he would be barred from running for president of South Africa.

Zuma is a Zulu chieftain who is credited with having played an important role in mediating the tribal warfare between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party in the transitional period leading up to the 1994 election. A Zulu traditionalist on social issues, he appeals to South Africans on the basis of his intuitiveness, openness to consultation and inclusiveness on public policy issues. He has a sense of theatre and his supporters enjoy watching him sing and dance in the public arena. His style is in stark contrast to Mbeki’s cerebral mastery of government policy and management and seeming indifference to what people think of him.

Zuma’s support is rooted in a deep-seated sense that the ANC has lost its way and is not responding quickly enough to people’s needs. He has attracted the support of the leadership of COSATU, the SACP, the ANC Women’s League and the ANC Youth League. Others who are harshly critical of Mbeki – for his policies on HIV-AIDS, Zimbabwe and corruption; for his failure to address poverty more aggressively; and for a style which can appeal to nativist racial instincts by treating criticism as disloyalty – do not necessarily endorse Zuma, but welcome a peaceful and democratic change in the ANC leadership.

In the event that Zuma cannot stand, or chooses not to, the frontrunner for the presidency is Kgalema Motlanthe, party Deputy President and a former leader in the Union of Mineworkers, who has supported Zuma through the difficult times.

The current ANC government is moving to increase efforts to alleviate poverty. There was a marked departure from conservative fiscal policies after the 2004 election in which the ANC ran on a platform of “a people’s contract to create jobs and fight poverty,” promising to create a million six-month jobs through public works. In 2005, this took the form of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, disappointed that sound fiscal policy had failed to attract the anticipated foreign and domestic investments, became deliberately more interventionist under AsgiSA, increasing income security grants and investing in labour-intensive programs for roads, water, sanitation, electricity, housing, schools, clinics, sports facilities, early childhood development and home-based care. Government procurement policies require successful tenders to incorporate opportunities for women, youth, cooperatives and small and medium Black enterprises, while financial institutions are providing credit opportunities for previously marginalized people.

The government and its successor in 2009 face tight economic times. Looking forward to rising prices for food and gasoline, and a probable doubling of electricity rates in the next two or three years as South Africa belatedly recognizes its failure to plan power installations, economists are now predicting 11 per cent inflation, double the target set by the Reserve Bank. The Bank could decide it will have to tighten monetary policy by raising interest rates and thus slow down the economy and adversely affect job creation.

But there is room to manoeuvre. The Mbeki-Manuel stewardship leaves a legacy of budget surpluses since 2006, with net public debt projected at a very respectable 16 per cent of GDP in 2011. The new government should thus be in a position to increase government expenditures so as to live up to South Africa’s commitments to the UN Millennium Development Goals of halving the number of households living on less than $1 per day by 2014. Whether this will also meaningfully redistribute wealth, adequately widen access to services and redress past injustices is a more difficult question.

The road is that much steeper because of the impact of the AIDS pandemic. The five and a half million currently HIV-positive people who are expected to die in the next 15 years will leave a generation of orphans and a country reeling from its lost teachers, policemen and skilled professionals.

Meanwhile, as this is being written, the crisis following upon the Zimbabwe election shows no sign of abating. Zimbabwe has 80 per cent unemployment, inflation at 100,000 per cent a year and violence-prone state security, and is no longer self sufficient in food after the expropriation of large White-owned farms. It is estimated that more than two million people have fled to South Africa; there will be more if Zimbabwe deteriorates into a brutal conflagration. The world is looking to South Africa to resolve the situation, but there is no sign that Thabo Mbeki will intervene meaningfully. Though much criticized abroad – and increasingly at home, even by key elements in his own party – he defends quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy to the point of lending public support to Robert Mugabe. He seems committed to this policy as part of a wider strategy of working with other African heads of state for regional and continental cooperation.

In this as in many areas we see a new nation that is promising yet vulnerable, always inspirational but at times outrageous and almost maddening, impressive in the solidarity in its efforts to improve the lot of the people yet driven by the demons of its history. The challenges it will face are many and daunting. Yet on balance, as a work in progress, South Africa remains a beacon to the world. It has proven equal if not superior to comparable countries in its ability to resolve conflicts and manage its economy. The ANC has been able to renew itself. As it continues to do so, it will be watched, second-guessed and constrained by the constitution and the courts, civil society, the unions, business interests, the media and, ultimately, the people.